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Regional Governance in Unitary
States: Lessons from the Netherlands
in Comparative Perspective
RUDIE HULST
Faculty of Social Science, Free University, Amsterdam
ABSTRACT There is a growing need for regional governance in Western European
countries. Unitary states and nations like the Netherlands, France and England do not
(yet) have fully ﬂedged, general purpose intermediate governments that can fulﬁl this
need. This article reviews the institutional arrangements for regional governance in the
countries mentioned. The existing arrangements turn out to have a great deal in
common and show comparable ﬂaws. Drawing on experience from France and the
Netherlands, and against the background of the debate on elected Regional Assemblies
in England, the article reﬂects on the need for an autonomous regional government and
the requirements it has to meet.
Ten years ago, Sharpe and others described the ‘rise of meso government’,
throughout European countries (Sharpe, 1993a). Since then, there has been
a growing body of literature based on the need for regional government. The
main argument put forward is that there is a growing need for strategic
planning at the regional level and that regional government would deliver
accountability and democracy to regional governance (DETR, 2000a: 15–
20). The arguments for regional planning are several. In the ﬁrst place,
regional planning is considered a means to overcome failure in social and
economic planning by central government (Murphy & Caborn, 1995). In
several countries, the need for decentralised economic planning gave rise to
a transfer of competencies to intermediate levels of government, i.e. in Spain
and in France (Cuchillo, 1993; Mazey, 1993). In the second place, there is a
growing need for the co-ordination of local government policies, as many of
the social processes relevant for local policies are no longer restricted to the
territory of local government (Wannop, 1995: 375). In some European
countries, this issue has been (partly) addressed by enlarging the scale of
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local government, i.e. in Sweden and in the UK. In other countries
intermediate levels of government have been entrusted with powers to plan
and co-ordinate local government policies. A third argument for regional
government is found in the European Structural Funds. Under the principle
of subsidiarity, Europe adheres to the active involvement of sub-national
government in regional development planning, and some argue that regional
government is necessary to ensure proper access to European funding
(DETR, 2000a: 19).
Sharpe’s book at the same time showed that unitary states like France, the
Netherlands and (at that time) the UK, more than federal states, had
diﬃculties to create adequate institutional arrangements for regional
governance. Historically, central and local government dominate their
administrative systems and they lack fully ﬂedged, general purpose regional
governments (Sharpe, 1993b: 253–273; Mazey, 1993: 82–85; Toonen, 1993).
This article gives an account of institutional arrangements for regional
governance in the Netherlands and their performance over the last 20 years.
It compares the Dutch experience with arrangements and practices of
regional planning and co-ordination in France and in England.1 Finally, it
reﬂects upon the requirements for an autonomous regional government.
Institutional Frameworks and their Outcomes
The Netherlands
The Constitution of 1848 introduced a decentralised unitary state with three
tiers of general government: central government, the province and the
municipality. The fact that the Constitution stipulates a general competence
for provinces and municipalities to issue bylaws and deliver services, justiﬁes
the description ‘decentralised’. The unitary character stems from the fact
that the national legislator, i.e. government and the two chambers of
parliament, has complete sovereignty. The legislative bodies are free to
interpret the Constitution as they see ﬁt and there are no speciﬁc safeguards
for the autonomy of provinces or local government. So, the Constitution
creates a general purpose intermediate government, but whether the
province can actually function as a regional government largely depends
on the national legislator.
Provinces, but no regional government. Until 1960 the domain of the
province was limited to the provision for provincial infrastructure and the
supervision over budgets and ﬁnancial transactions of local government.
With the rise of the welfare state the provincial domain broadened. The
Spatial Planning Act (1962) instructed provinces to develop long term
spatial plans and to supervise local structure and zoning plans. Over the
years, spatial planning has become one of the main provincial activities
with a substantial impact on town and country planning by local
100 R. Hulst
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
18
:4
3 
31
 M
ay
 2
01
1
government. Subsequently, a series of laws called in provinces to play a
part in the development and execution of plans in a range of policy
sectors, i.e. health care, social and cultural policies, waste disposal and
environmental policies.
Despite the expansion of activities of provincial government, its power
vis-a`-vis local government remained restricted. In most policy areas
provincial plans served as a basis for central government to allocate
ﬁnancial resources to local government. Provincial government mainly
fulﬁlled the role of an intermediary agency for central government. Since the
1980s the position of the province has become rather weaker than stronger.
In 1980 central government embarked upon a series of decentralisation
projects to restore the position of local government. In several policy areas
decentralisation eliminated provincial competencies for planning, resource
allocation and supervision.2
We have lingered over details of the position of provincial government in
the administrative system, because at ﬁrst sight it seems to fulﬁl the
institutional requirements for regional government. In fact it does not.
Despite the general purpose character that is entailed in the Constitution,
provincial governments’ actual domain and competencies are very limited.
Although in some areas the province plays a substantial role, it is by no
means equipped or legitimised to act as an overall regional planning
institution that co-ordinates and integrates policies of local government.
This is best illustrated by the fact that since the 1950s there has been an
ongoing public debate on ‘the regional issue’ (Blaas & Dostal, 1989: 236–
238; Hendriks, 1997; Hulst, 2000: 1–20). In the 50 years that have passed, a
series of proposals has been forwarded to create new institutions for
regional government, all meant to provide for the necessary planning and
co-ordination of local government activities and to take over part of the
responsibilities of central government. None has been implemented. In
practice the regional issue has largely been addressed by voluntary and
mandatory co-operation between municipalities.
Voluntary co-operation between municipalities. From 1930 on, the possibi-
lities for co-operation between municipalities were steadily broadened and
in 1950 a special law – the Joint Provisions Act – was enacted to stimulate
and regulate co-operation between local governments. A large number of
single-purpose regional agencies resulted.3 As the number of regional
agencies increased, the drawbacks of these institutional arrangements
became more evident. Regional policy-making was highly fragmented and
hardly susceptible to political control by the elected local councils. In 1985,
a revision of the Joint Provisions Act obliged local governments to integrate
all existing regional agencies into a multi-purpose regional corporation.
Furthermore, the act stipulated that a regional council consisting of
members of the elected councils of the participating municipalities would
govern the regional corporation.
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The regional corporations – actually there are around 40 – oﬀer public
services that individual municipalities themselves cannot eﬃciently provide
for, ranging from ﬁre brigades, basic health services, ambulances, the issuing
of permits for taxis to waste disposal. Public service delivery by regional
corporations is generally considered to be satisfactory. This is not the case
with regional planning. The municipalities have entrusted most regional
corporations with a general responsibility for the co-ordination and
planning of local activities with respect to economic development, public
transport, education, cultural and recreational facilities, social work, health
care, environment, spatial planning and public housing. However, the
corporations lack the necessary means to eﬀectively co-ordinate local
policies. The municipalities are reluctant to equip the regional corporations
with the necessary powers, not wanting to give up their autonomy. As a
result, regional planning and co-ordination entirely depend on consensual
decision-making between all municipalities involved.
In our own research we found that, even when all municipalities
recognised the need for regional co-ordination, and they sometimes put in
great eﬀorts, they rarely succeeded in establishing regional plans (Hulst,
2000: 72–78). In a setting where unanimity constitutes a requirement for
actual decision-making, parochial interests tend to predominate. In some
regions we encountered a culture that favoured co-operation. In the end,
however, it was the interests that counted, and in many regions the conﬂicts
of interests that are part and parcel of regional planning hindered eﬀective
co-ordination (Hulst, 2000: 83–90).
Mandatory co-operation in the metropolitan areas. Towards the end of the
1980s, the inadequacies of regional planning through voluntary co-
operation became more and more evident. This was thought especially
worrying for the metropolitan areas. While the process of European
integration called for vital metropolises to compete with other European
commercial and industrial centres, cities like Amsterdam, Rotterdam and
The Hague fought long lasting battles with neighbouring municipalities
about the development of commercial and residential areas and investments
in infrastructure and public transport. In 1990, central government
embarked upon a project to create new administrative structures for the
metropolitan areas, i.e. new small-scale city provinces. Wise from
experience, however, central government did not attempt a top down
reorganisation. It invited the municipalities in the metropolitan areas to set
up special regional corporations. A special act entrusted the new regional
authorities with a series of competencies for regional planning and co-
ordination with respect to public housing, infrastructure and transport,
economic development, among others. Moreover, the new corporations
received resources to ﬁnance local government projects in a series of policy
sectors. The new regional corporations were meant to be temporary and to
serve as a stepping-stone for the establishment of city provinces. However,
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after much discussion the idea of city provinces was dropped, and in 2003
government proposed a bill to give the special regional corporations a
permanent status.
Whereas regional corporations based on the Joint Provisions Act are
characterised by voluntary co-operation, co-operation between municipa-
lities in the metropolitan corporations is mandatory. Once the municipalities
in metropolitan areas consent in the constitution of the regional corpora-
tion, the law prescribes a domain and attributes competencies and ﬁnancial
means to the corporation. In theory, this constitutes autonomous regional
institutions with suﬃcient powers to co-ordinate local government policies.
In practice, the metropolitan regional corporations have achieved some
successes, but they did not fulﬁl a series of tasks that were the very reason
for their existence.
Our own research showed that most corporations in the metropolitan
areas were very reluctant to use regional plans as a basis for the allocation of
ﬁnancial resources. They favoured proportional disbursement and max-
imum spending autonomy for local government (Hulst, 2000: 129–137). An
evaluation study on regional governance in the Amsterdam area reported
that most of the regional plans established by the corporation just summed
up the wishes of local government and did not in any way deal with the
actual regional issues. And if they did, they could not be carried out due to
conﬂicts of interests between the municipalities (Hulst, 2001: 16).
The main explanation for the relatively poor performance of the
metropolitan regional corporations is that their hands remain tied to the
participating municipalities. As is the case with the voluntary based
corporations, the regional councils consist of indirectly elected members,
representatives of the local councils. Committees, where all municipalities
are represented and can pursue their own interests, are the actual decision-
makers. This hinders genuine regional planning and produces policies that
circumvent the real regional issues (Hulst, 2000: 141–142).
Regional government. Above we mentioned that the Dutch administrative
system does not contain a fully ﬂedged regional government. However,
during a period of 20 years, in the Rotterdam region a directly elected
regional government existed, very similar to the Greater London Authority.
The so-called Rijnmond Corporation was created with the explicit purpose
to co-ordinate the policies of the 16 municipalities in the Rotterdam
metropolitan area. The corporation had formal authority to establish
regional plans, to supervise local plans and to issue bylaws and direct
instructions to local government on a series of policy issues. We found that
the regional corporation eﬀectively co-ordinated local government policies
(Hulst, 2000: 97–103). This was not the outcome of top-down, hierarchical
steering. The Rijnmond Corporation was very aware that it depended
heavily on local government for the implementation of regional strategic
planning. Consequently, it engaged in extensive consultations with local
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government to generate input and create support for regional plans and
policies, which resulted in a practice very similar to the wheeling and dealing
we found in other regional policy networks. The fact that local government
recognised Rijnmond as a legitimate regional policy-maker, the fact that the
regional corporation was well informed on local policy issues and that it had
the formal authority and the ﬁnancial resources to eventually bring around
unwilling planning partners formed the key to success (Hulst, 2000: 116–
121).
Although the existing legal framework does not attribute a general
responsibility for regional planning and co-ordination to provinces, some
provinces over the years have claimed this responsibility and have made
eﬀorts to develop and implement regional plans in various policy sectors. In
our own research we studied one particular province that created an
elaborate system of regional planning to co-ordinate the policies of its 114
municipalities. We found that the province was not equipped to act as a
regional policy actor against that number of municipalities. It lacked the
necessary powers and policy information, and was not accepted as a
legitimate planning partner by local government. It was not able to bring
local government to develop regional plans through inter-municipal co-
operation, nor was it capable of developing feasible plans itself (Hulst, 2000:
111–120).
Our research on voluntary co-operation between local governments
suggested that provinces, confronted with a large number of local
governments, should try a new approach. The key factor seemed to ﬁnd
strategies to reinforce mutual interdependencies between municipalities and
thereby strengthen the basis for co-operation. We suggested that the
province delegate decision-making authority on ﬁnancial resources and on
spatial planning to regional corporations in exchange for their commitment
to engage in regional policy-making and under the condition that regional
policies would be established within a certain time frame and would meet
some minimum standards. One of the provinces involved in our research
adopted this strategy and entered into contracts with the ten regional
corporations in its territory. On average, the strategy proved successful.
Regional policy-making boomed if compared to the ten preceding years.
The contracts created suﬃcient leverage for municipalities to seriously
engage in regional co-ordination, although they could not resolve all the
conﬂicting interests and this sometimes resulted in symbolic policies (Hulst,
2000: 149–175).
Still struggling. Fifty years after it reached the political agenda, the
Netherlands is still struggling with the organisation of regional governance.
In view of the experience with diﬀerent strategies for regional governance,
we can make some concluding remarks.
First of all, it does not suﬃce for an autonomous regional government
(i.e. the province) to be responsible for regional planning. To be eﬀective,
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regional government needs both adequate administrative powers and
legitimacy to settle regional issues and to generate the necessary support
and co-operation from local government. In the Netherlands, these
prerequisites are not fulﬁlled. Moreover, for several reasons it is unlikely
that they will be in the near future. The province has never been considered
as an administrative entity of equal standing to local and central
government. In the nineteenth century the role of the province was
downplayed out of fear of the resurrection of federalism. As a result, the
province became an intermediate agent largely bestowed with technical,
non-political functions, and with little political visibility (Hulst, 2000: 4–7).
These very characteristics are now held against it: why would we take away
powers from our precious local government and attribute these to the
distant and invisible province? This creates a kind of a vicious circle: the
province will not overcome its status of a paper tiger precisely because it is
considered a paper tiger.
Consequently, co-operation between local governments is, and will
remain for some time, the only institutional arrangement for regional
governance. Although some of the obvious drawbacks have been addressed
– the high fragmentation and the entirely voluntary character of the regional
corporations – the main problem has not. The regional corporations are
dominated by the very municipalities they are supposed to govern. Although
co-operation is sometimes successful because of contingent circumstances,
there are no structural provisions to ﬁght the centrifugal forces from which
regional corporations suﬀer.
France
During a long time the French administrative system contained two main
tiers of local government: the departments (96) and the municipalities or
communes (36,000).4 While the communes are the democratic heart of the
republic and have a general competence to undertake any activities they
deem necessary, the departments provide (a part of) the services beyond
communal resources or services that need to be organised on a larger scale.
Moreover, the departments serve as an administrative level for the
implementation of state policies, with the prefect representing the state
and all its ministries and agencies (Norton, 1994: 140–144, 152–153).
Departments do not, however, provide for the co-ordination of local
government policies with respect to territorial and environmental planning
and the planning of social and economic activities and infrastructure.
Regional planning is a matter of the state, of the regions and of co-operation
between local governments.
Regions. As early as 1964 a rudimentary framework for regional planning
was set up, primarily consisting of advisory committees with representatives
of the ministerial ﬁeld services, experts and members of the socio-economic
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and political elite in the region. In 1972 the committees were substituted by
regional public bodies and regional councils with limited functional powers
that included the allocation of (modest) regional budgets to public works
programmes and projects. Gradually central government increased the
budgetary and policy-making powers of the regions.
The 1982 Deﬀerre reforms transformed the regional public bodies into
regional governments. It was considered a major shift towards the
decentralisation of the French state (De Montricher, 1995; Le Gale`s &
John, 1997). In 1986 the regions became authorities with executive and
revenue-raising powers and directly elected regional councils and presidents.
The formal responsibilities of the regional governments include urbanism,
the planning of public transport and infrastructure, the planning and
construction of secondary schools, economic planning and environmental
and cultural activities. Overall, policy instruments are limited to the
allocation of investment budgets.
There were several motives for the establishment of decentralised regional
governments, but at least one of them related to the limitations of central
economic planning vis-a`-vis an increasingly complex society. One of the
main issues was that central planning was not sophisticated enough to stop
the growing economic disparities between regions. Decentralisation would
enhance the participation of local government, private economic actors and
citizens and thereby render public policies more eﬀective (Mazey, 1993: 77–
78; De Montricher, 1995: 105).
Almost 20 years after the founding of regional government, the regions
have not developed into a general purpose intermediate level of government
ﬁt for regional planning. Although regions are actually involved in policy-
making in many sectors, they have little decisive inﬂuence. They have not
been able to eﬀectively co-ordinate policies of local government. Institu-
tional weakness is held responsible for this poor performance. Regions – as
a matter of principle – have no formal authority over local government.
Their budgets rose fast during the ﬁrst years of their existence, but stabilised
after 1992 and until 1999 amounted to no more than 10% of the total
expenditure of local government. Moreover, regional autonomy was
curtailed, as the regions were required to follow the states’ development
priorities.
Regions were considered politically weak institutions, as regional
elections took place within departmental constituencies. This encouraged
the promotion of departmental interests and caused regions to behave more
as federations of departments than as truly regional governments (Balme,
1995: 167–169; Scargill, 1996: 192; Le Gale`s & John, 1997: 53–54). Here, we
can see a certain similarity between the French regions and the Dutch
regional corporations. Overall, regional government is far from a fully
developed intermediate government equipped and legitimised to plan and
co-ordinate local government policies (Le Gale`s & John, 1997: 55–57; Jouve,
1997: 367).
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However, some remarks are in order. First, there are notable exceptions
to this rather gloomy picture of French regional government. In Nord-Pas-
de-Calais, Bretagne and Languedoc-Rousillion regional governments
developed relatively successful economic initiatives. Furthermore, regional
governments have sought new ways to manifest themselves, engaging in
arrangements with a large number of public and private actors, bypassing
their weak formal powers. Moreover, in 1999, a reform of the statute for
regional elections introduced single regional constituencies, in order to ﬁght
parochial decision-making.
Second, the administrative system is at the edge of substantial changes. A
2003 constitutional reform introduced decentralisation as a core principle
for the organisation of the Republic, and subsequently, in 2004, parliament
has approved a package of decentralisation measures. This operation, called
L’acte II de la decentralisation, will strengthen the position of the regions,
especially in economic development and planning, infrastructure and
transport, the planning of health care, tourism and professional education
(Rapport du Se´nat, 2003).
Voluntary and mandatory co-operation. The 1982 decentralisation reforms
not only established regional government; they also enhanced the
responsibilities of the communes. The traditional functions – civil register,
municipal police, local infrastructure and primary schools – were extended
to include town planning, public education, economic activities and public
service provision. The reduction of central rules for the spending of speciﬁc
grants increased the ﬁnancial autonomy of the communes (De Maurel, 1993:
145–146). Decentralisation was implemented, however, without reforming
the territorial scale of local government. As a consequence a vast majority of
the 36,000 communes were faced with new functions they could not fulﬁl
eﬃciently due to their small scale. So, the retreat of the central state
increased the need for co-operation and co-ordination of (the new) local
government activities (Norton, 1994: 146).
As is the case in the Netherlands, in France voluntary co-operation
between local governments has been a long tried strategy to overcome the
limitations of scale. In 1972 there existed over 9,000 single-purpose joint
councils of communes and more than 1,200 multi-purpose joint councils.
Public service delivery was by far the most important ﬁeld of action, i.e.
water supply, sewage, energy supply, refuse collection, the maintenance of
highways and school bus services. Since 1982 central government has
launched a number of initiatives to further co-operation between local
government, especially as a means to regional planning and co-
ordination.
The Law on Territorial Administration (1992) introduced new corpora-
tions – communities of communes – with two mandatory functions:
economic development and territorial planning. Proﬁtable ﬁnancial
arrangements were to encourage the formation of the new corporations.
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Initially, communities of communes were mainly set up in the rural areas of
France (De Maurel, 1993: 151; Scargill, 1996: 189–190). In 1999,
government introduced a new type of urban communities and agglomera-
tion communities, with a series of mandatory tasks concerning social,
economic and cultural development and territorial planning. With the
introduction of these new institutions co-operation loses part of its
voluntary character as the domain and competencies are prescribed by
law, in much the same way as is done in the case of the metropolitan
corporations in the Netherlands.
If we look at the development of arrangements for co-operation between
local government bodies, they show a substantial increase over time (see
Table 1). Moreover, it is evident that co-operation between local
government is highly fragmented: communes participate at the same time
in several single- or multi-purpose joint councils and in a community of
communes or cities. In many cases these institutions organise diﬀerent
groups of communes.
In order to ﬁght fragmentation, the Law of Territorial Management and
Development (1995) introduced the concept of pays. The term pays refers to
a territory with a geographical, cultural, economic or social cohesion and is
meant to function as an organising principle for co-operation between
communes. On 1 January 2004, 298 pays had been identiﬁed according to the
procedures and criteria contained in the law; 99 of them had established
administrative boards and 33 pays had signed contracts with central
government on economic and social planning. The introduction of the pays
represents a clear eﬀort to integrate and concentrate inter-municipal co-
operation and to accomplish that it covers functionally coherent territorial
units.5
There are no comprehensive reports on the performance of voluntary and
mandatory co-operation between local government entities. There are
relatively successful urban communities, i.e. the urban community of
Table 1. Institutional co-operation between local government in France*
1972 1988 1995 2003
Single-purpose joint councils (SIVU) 9,289 11,967 14,490 14,885**
Multi-purpose joint councils (SIVOM) 1,243 2,076 2,298 2,165**
Urban districts 95 153 324 –***
Communities of communes 756 2,195
Communities of villes 4 –***
Agglomeration communities 143
Urban communities 9 9 9 14
Total 10,541 14,043 16,801
* The table does not include mixed joint councils of government institutions and private groups
** Data from 1999
*** Abolished in 1999 and transformed into one of the other forms of co-operation
Source: Direction Ge´ne´ral des Collectivite´s Locales: les collectivite´s locales en chiﬀres 2004
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Bordeaux, where a large number of communes co-operate in the planning of
major infrastructure projects for the agglomeration. There are more urban
agglomerations, however, where co-operation for regional planning is not
institutionalised or where urban communities are paralysed because of
political rivalries and conﬂicts of interests between the participants,
although recently some progress seems to have been made (Scargill, 1996:
189–190; 2001). Even the more successful French communities show some
typical features of voluntary and mandatory co-operation, very similar to
the ones we found in the Netherlands: proportional disbursement of funds
to the participating communes and the adherence to non-intervention
politics in communal aﬀairs, save exceptional circumstances (Savary, 1998;
Hulst, 2000: 133–135).
Moving away from fragmentation, overlap and consensual decision-making.
For a long time, fragmentation and overlap have characterised the
institutional framework for regional governance in France, the regions
and the communities of communes engaging in economic and spatial
planning on diﬀerent territorial scales; the departements and the (bigger)
communes fulﬁlling executive functions directly relevant to economic and
spatial development. In the absence of hierarchical relations between the
diﬀerent levels of government co-ordination has been a matter of
consensual decision-making. The only standing vertical co-ordination
mechanisms have been the planning agreements between the communities
of communes, the pays and the regions on the one hand and the central
state on the other. Consensual decision-making has also characterised
regional planning on the (sub)departmental scale and on the scale of the
region. Both have suﬀered from centrifugal forces due to conﬂicting
interests and electoral systems.
Recent years, however, have shown two important developments that
may lead to a simpler, more transparent and more eﬀective system of sub-
national governance. First, the establishment and further development of
the pays will create a more integrated sub-regional government that may
function as a platform to co-ordinate municipal and departmental policies.
Second, the decentralisation operation will substantially strengthen the
position of the regions and will at the same time remove a lot of the
overlap in responsibilities between diﬀerent sub-national governments that
has grown over time. Two questions remain, both inspired by the
experience with regional governance in the Netherlands. The ﬁrst is
whether the reorganisation of inter-municipal co-operation will result in
eﬀective co-ordination between the municipalities and the departments.
The contracts between the central state and the pays may create suﬃcient
mutual interdependencies to stimulate co-operation, but they only cover
part of the policy areas to be co-ordinated. The second question is whether
the regions’ prime responsibility for economic development and their
growing responsibilities in a series of other policy areas will translate into
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eﬀective vertical co-ordination. In the absence of hierarchical relations this
will depend on the ability of the regions for strategic use of their ﬁnancial
resources.
England
Compared to the French communes and the Dutch municipalities, the basic
units of local government in England – districts, boroughs and unitary
authorities – are huge, with an average population of nearly 130,000. Some
have argued that the large scale of English local government makes regional
government unnecessary (Jones, 1988). Sharpe considered the county the
true meso-government of the United Kingdom, as it can cope with the
increased functional scale of public service delivery, population mobility and
service externalities (Sharpe, 1993b: 274). It is self-evident that large-scale
local government diminishes the need for regional planning and co-
ordination, compared to administrative systems with small basic govern-
ment units. Nevertheless, regional strategic decision-making on territorial
planning, economic development, infrastructure and public transport is
more and more necessary. This is especially true after the abolition of the
former metropolitan counties and the creation of unitary authorities, as the
external eﬀects of the policies mentioned go far beyond the borders of
districts and boroughs (Wannop, 1995: 373). Moreover, as in other
European countries, the need for an intermediate level of government in
England also relates to issues of devolution and to social and economic
planning in relation to the European Structural Funds.
At present, the Greater London Authority is the only democratically
elected body that is responsible for strategic decision-making at an
intermediate level of government. It co-ordinates the policies of the London
boroughs with respect to transport, spatial planning and economic and
social development, and thus may be considered a regional government in
the proper sense. Outside the London area there is no form of intermediate
general-purpose government. This does not mean that regional planning has
not been a point of interest. It has been in the past and recently, the Labour
government’s White Paper (2002) Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalising the
English Regions has set out plans to enhance regional governance. We will
discuss some of the past experiences with regional planning and the
proposals of the White Paper.
The past: regional governance through central government agencies. As was
the case in France, in the early 1960s institutions were set up to produce
regional plans within the framework of the National Plan. Regional
Economic Planning Councils and Boards were installed for each of the eight
English regions outside London (and one each for Scotland and Wales). The
Councils were drawn from local government, business and other interest
groups; the Boards comprised of regional representatives of government
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departments concerned with regional planning. Central government
envisaged that the regional institutions would eventually be turned into
elected regional governments (Lindley, 1982: 172–173). The demise of the
National Plan, the abolition of the mother Department of Economic
Aﬀairs, and the Local Government Act of 1972 introducing large scale
counties, all contributed to a diﬀerent outcome. The regional institutions
slowly atrophied and were ﬁnally abolished in the early 1980s (Lindley,
1982: 183–189; Sharpe 1993b: 253–255).
Since then, and until 1997, regional planning in England was mainly in
the hands of regional branches of departments, agencies and quasi-
autonomous organisations, a manifestation of the increasing central control
over local government during the consecutive Conservative Cabinets. As the
primary concern of these organisations was the delivery of speciﬁc functions
and not the management of territory, a variety of regional boundaries
developed, which complicated an already diﬃcult task of co-ordination of
regional policies (Hogwood & Lindley, 1982; DETR, 2000a: 13–14). The
growing importance of regional strategic planning to obtain subsidies from
the European Regional Development Fund, and the increasing complexity
of the regeneration task involving a great number of private and public
actors, brought out the importance of a co-ordinated central government
presence at the regional level (Mawson & Spencer, 1997: 73). In 1994 the
Government Oﬃces for the Regions (GOR) were introduced in England. At
present they integrate the English regional services of ten departments and
oﬃces of central government.
The present: regional governance through voluntary co-operation. Only
recently, in the slipstream of the devolution process regarding Scotland
and Wales, steps have been taken to decentralise planning for the regions of
England. The Labour government promoted the establishment of Regional
Chambers, although it did not establish the new directly elected tier of
government that the Labour manifesto had suggested. The Regional
Chambers or Regional Assemblies, as they call themselves, are bodies that
include councillors from local government authorities and other stake-
holders in the economic, social and environmental well-being of the regions.
Initially the participants had to provide funds for the establishment of the
assemblies; recently central government has decided to subsidise their
activities.
Central to the new regional planning eﬀorts are the Regional Develop-
ment Agencies, non-departmental public bodies, one for each of the nine
regions (including London). Core functions of the RDAs are, among others,
the development and implementation of regional economic strategies and
the social, physical and economic regeneration of urban and rural areas,
including the administration of regeneration budgets. Moreover the RDAs
are expected to contribute to transport and infrastructure planning, to
protecting the environment, to ensuring an appropriate spread of resources
Regional Governance in Unitary States 111
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
18
:4
3 
31
 M
ay
 2
01
1
and to co-ordination between regional agencies that cover tourism, culture,
media and sport (DETR, 1997).
Parallel to the promotion of regional economic development planning, the
Labour government shook up the system for spatial planning. It considered
that the existing system of Regional Planning Guidance5 lacked regional
focus and was too narrowly land-use orientated. Therefore it proposed that
the Regional Planning Guidance would broaden its scope and provide a
spatial framework for economic development plans, strategies for transport,
energy, air quality and waste, and for operational plans for infrastructure
and service provision. Furthermore, local government and other regional
stakeholders must take the lead in the actual development of the Regional
Planning Guidance, through Regional Planning Bodies or Regional
Assemblies. Formal responsibility for the issue of the Regional Planning
Guidance remains with central government (DETR, 1998; White Paper,
2002).
The institutional arrangements for regional governance that have been
introduced since 1997 are still too young for conclusive statements to be
made about their performance. It is clear though that eﬀective regional
governance entirely depends on co-operation between key institutions
such as the Government Oﬃce, the Regional Development Agency, the
Regional Assembly, the Regional Planning Body and other stakeholders
in the regional arena. At the same time there are tensions between the
institutions involved that hinder the realisation of genuine regional
policies (Stephenson & Poxon, 2001: 109). Given the experiences with
voluntary co-operation in the Netherlands and in France, we would not
expect otherwise.
One of the main issues is the integration of economic development
planning and spatial planning. Diﬀerent institutions take the lead in the
respective planning tasks and there are no built in mechanisms to resolve
diﬀerences of view (Roberts & Lloyd, 2000; Stephenson & Poxon, 2001:
118). Although a wide range of regional stakeholders stress the need for
clariﬁcation of the relationship between spatial and economic development
planning, central government has refused to issue rules to that eﬀect. It
merely suggested that the regions themselves give the Regional Assemblies a
central role in the development of integrated regional strategies (DETR
2000b).
Whether this will suﬃce to develop integral regional strategies and to
procure implementation remains doubtful. Regional planning activities have
been taken up with evident enthusiasm by at least part of the new
institutions (Roberts & Lloyd, 2000; Stephenson & Poxon, 2001). Never-
theless it is obvious that regional strategic planning implies diﬃcult choices
where interests of small and big local entities, of shire and urban areas and
of economics, housing, recreation and environment will frequently conﬂict.
These diverging interests will be reﬂected in the representatives of local
government and other stakeholders that make out the regional institutions.
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And who will leave his primary loyalty at the door of the conference room
and develop a genuine regional perspective (Wannop, 1995: 387)? Even if
regional institutions overcome their internal diﬀerences of view, and succeed
in compromising with other regional actors, it will be diﬃcult to overcome
NIMBY behaviour of local government. Typically, local government in the
South East supported the urban renaissance concept in the Regional
Planning Guidance, but equally felt that it should not be applied in their
own area (Carmona, 2001: 212). The existing regional institutions do not
possess legislative powers and they cannot establish strategic plans that in
some way bind the local authorities. They can only allocate part of the
ﬁnancial resources that concern regional strategic projects.
The future: regional government? The White Paper on the regions sets out a
two step strategy to strengthen regional governance. The ﬁrst step entails the
enhancement of the existing regional structures, allowing the Regional
Development Agencies more ﬂexibility in the allocation of resources and
strengthening the role of the Regional Assemblies in diﬀerent areas of
regional planning. The second step implies the establishment of elected
Regional Assemblies for those regions where people would vote for them in
a referendum. A sounding exercise to assess the interest in an assembly
referendum has resulted in a decision to hold referendums in three of the
eight English regions.
Once established, the assemblies’ responsibilities will include regional
strategies dealing with economic development, sustainable development,
housing, transport, skills and employment, and culture. The Regional
Development Agencies will be accountable to their elected assembly. The
assemblies will receive a single block grant from central government that
integrates existing speciﬁc grants and they will enjoy maximum ﬂexibility
over how to spend the money allocated to them. Moreover, the assemblies
will take over the responsibility from central government to issue spatial
strategies and will exercise supervision on a number of regional institutions.
As is the case with the French regions, there will be no hierarchical
relations between regional and local government; there will be no
transference of competencies from local government to regional govern-
ment. The establishment of elected assemblies will, however, imply a
reorganisation of the local government structure. In order to simplify
relations between local and regional government the remaining two-tier
local government authorities will be transformed into unitary local
authorities.
All in all, according to the plans set out in the White Paper, elected
Regional Assemblies will create a form of autonomous regional government
in many ways comparable to the French regions, with no formal authority
over local government but with a range of responsibilities for regional
planning and with control over substantial ﬁnancial resources. The
referendums will of course decide on the actual establishment of elected
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Regional Assemblies. For those regions that do not opt for elected Regional
Assemblies, voluntary co-operation between local government, regional
institutions and private sector stakeholders will remain the dominant
strategy for regional governance.
Two Strategies for Regional Governance
Our discussion of inter-municipal co-operation and regional institutions in
the Netherlands, France and England shows that there are two strategies in
use to meet the growing need for regional governance: regional governance
through co-operation between institutions from diﬀerent administrative
levels and other stakeholders on the one hand, and the establishment of
autonomous regional government on the other. Comparing institutional
arrangements and experiences we can make a series of evaluating comments.
Regional Governance Through Co-operation
The existing Regional Assemblies and the Regional Development Agencies
in England, the communities of communes and the regions in France, the
regional and metropolitan corporations in the Netherlands constitute
horizontal policy networks engaged in regional planning, as none of the
participants has any formal authority to impose decisions on other policy
actors. This strategy for regional governance shows serious drawbacks from
the perspective of eﬀectiveness and democratic accountability.
In horizontal networks joint decision-making largely depends on the
character of the interdependencies between the actors (cf. Blau, 1964;
Godfroij, 1981). When interdependencies are symbiotic, i.e. when the goals
of actors coincide or when actors can contribute to the realisation of each
other’s policies through the exchange of resources, co-operation or joint
decision-making is likely to occur. When interdependencies are competitive,
i.e. when goals are incompatible and are only realised at the cost of other
actor’s goals, co-operation will not occur.
It is not surprising that co-operation between municipalities in France
and in the Netherlands ﬂourishes as a means to overcome the limitations of
scale with respect to the provision of public services. In general, all the
participating actors stand to gain from co-operation in terms of the
eﬃciency and quality of these services. Regional planning on the other hand
addresses the distribution of scarce goods and undesirable burdens. It
implies that local government must adapt its policies for the beneﬁt of its
neighbours or just for the sake of preventing the waste of public resources. It
implies competition between diﬀerent stakeholders for scarce resources. At
best, regional issues create mixed motive games: situations where policy
actors at the same time have incompatible and common interests (Scharpf,
1997). Whether the joint policy actors are able to come up with eﬀective
regional governance then depends on the characteristics of the institutional
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setting and on the existence of external incentives to collaborate (Scharpf,
2000: 779).
In all three countries we discussed, central government created ﬁnancial
incentives to promote the establishment of regional corporations. They were
eﬀective in the sense that local government entities created regional
institutions and thereby accepted the responsibility to engage in regional
policy-making. However, in none of the countries were the funds provided
by central government made dependent on the outcome, i.e. on the
development of plans that adequately address the regional issues. In France
and in the Netherlands this created leeway for local government to enjoy the
beneﬁts of participating in regional institutions, without paying the price of
eﬀective regional co-ordination.
A second characteristic of the policy networks is the fragmentation of
responsibilities with regard to diﬀerent policy sectors. Economic develop-
ment planning, the planning of infrastructure, environmental planning and
spatial planning must relate to each other. In the three countries under
consideration, responsibilities for regional planning on these subjects – as
far as they go – are divided: between the Regional Development Agencies
and the Regional Planning Bodies or Assemblies in England, between the
regions and the communities of communes in France and between the
regional corporations and the provinces in the Netherlands. The networks
lack structural provisions for the integration of regional planning on
diﬀerent policy sectors.
Our own research showed that positive sanctions that directly relate to the
outcome of co-operation between local government – which was the case in
the contractual arrangements between a province and its municipalities –
can, to some extent, overcome the centrifugal forces that inter-municipal co-
operation faces. In France, central government has started a major
operation to enter into contracts with the new pays on the organisation
and funding of a wide range of activities and public services in order to
promote integrated development policies. It is too early to tell whether these
strategies to further co-operation and integration within the highly
fragmented policy networks will be eﬀective in the long run or whether
they will prove to be time-consuming eﬀorts that result in predominantly
symbolic regional policies.
A third problem is the faulty democratic accountability with respect to
regional governance. This stems from two features of the policy networks.
In the ﬁrst place some of the regional institutions, i.e. the existing English
Regional Assemblies, the French communities of communes and pays and
the regional and metropolitan corporations in the Netherlands, have not got
directly elected boards or councils. In the second place, as we mentioned
before, regional governance is the outcome of consensual decision-making
within fragmented networks. This implies that the diﬀerent government
bodies may be held accountable for the stances they take in the bargaining
games, but not, or at best partially, for their outcome. Who must John
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Walker of Devon County, Jean le Duc of the commune of Rocamadour or
Kees Jansma of Leiderdorp turn to if they are unhappy with regional
investment plans that are the outcome of negotiations between the regional
institutions representing local government and central government agencies?
It is a matter of course that administrative systems dominated by central
and local government, when confronted with a growing need for regional
governance, tend to resort to strategies of co-operation between local
government, regionally based central government agencies, private sector
stakeholders etc. The establishment of fully ﬂedged, general purpose
regional government would imply a major change in the administrative
system, challenging central values and principles of the organisation of the
state, and would more than likely meet with broad opposition. However, as
the scope and complexity of the regional governance task grow bigger the
drawbacks of regional governance through co-operation will become more
evident.
Regional Governance Through Regional Government
The establishment of elected regional government addresses the problems of
regional governance through co-operation, at least at ﬁrst sight. The
concentration of decision-making powers with respect to diﬀerent policy
sectors provides a mechanism for the integration of planning eﬀorts in
diﬀerent policy areas. Regional government improves democratic account-
ability for regional governance, as directly elected councils formally
establish regional strategic plans and scrutinise the allocation of ﬁnancial
resources. Experience with regional government in the Netherlands and in
France gives rise to some caveats and comments about the institutional
features of regional government.
In the ﬁrst place there is the issue of the competencies of regional
government. Both the Dutch provinces and the French regions have suﬀered
from their relatively weak position in the administrative system. This has
not only caused their regional strategic planning to be inadequate, it has also
contributed to an image of political invisibility and to relatively low election
turnouts.6 It is understandable that the White Paper on regional governance
emphasises that the establishment of elected Regional Assemblies will not
aﬀect the competencies of local government, as this would surely generate
considerable opposition.7 However, if elected Regional Assemblies are not
adequately equipped to implement regional strategic planning, on occasion
against the will of local government, they run the same risk as their
European counterparts, to become relatively weak actors struggling for their
legitimacy, despite all the White Paper rhetoric about the beneﬁts of elected
regional government.
On the other hand, experience from Spain shows that (new) regional
governments, entrusted with formal authority over local government, tend
to expand their domain at the cost of the municipalities. Although organic
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laws contain safeguards for local autonomy, the position of Spanish local
government has weakened in favour of the autonomous regional govern-
ments (Carillo, 1997: 52). Therefore, it is vital to strike the right balance.
Experience with the Rijnmond Corporation in the Netherlands, mentioned
above, shows that a combination of supervision over strategic local
government decisions, the availability of ﬁnancial resources and the use of
strategic bargaining can result in eﬀective regional government, without
radically undermining the position of local government. Compared to the
Rijnmond Corporation the elected Regional Assemblies will have a lot of
responsibilities but limited powers.
A second issue concerns the organisation of local government in relation
to regional government. The relatively weak position of the French regions
and the Dutch provinces is at least partly caused by the large number of
counterparts within the region: municipalities; inter-municipal corporations
of diﬀerent size and complexion; departements (France). The Rijnmond
Corporation was able to pursue its successful bargaining strategies thanks to
the limited number of municipalities in the region and the absence of inter-
municipal corporations. From this perspective, the transformation of the
two-tier local government into unitary authorities that will accompany the
establishment of elected Regional Assemblies in England will create
favourable conditions for eﬀective strategic planning by regional govern-
ment.
A third comment relates to the role of the electoral system. Our discussion
of inter-municipal co-operation in France and the Netherlands has made it
clear that systems of indirect elections hamper eﬀective decision-making at
the regional level, as they tend to transfer the existing conﬂicts of interests
between the municipalities to the boards and councils that govern the
regional institutions and prevent the development of a genuine regional
perspective. Even the directly elected councils of the French regions in the
past suﬀered from parochial decision- making because of the use of
departmental constituencies. From this perspective, the Additional Member
System the White Paper puts forward for the election of the Regional
Assemblies, which combines elections through individual constituencies and
elections through a regional list, seems to address two of the potential risks
that regional government faces: invisibility due to a lack of identiﬁcation
with the voters on the one hand, and decision-making dominated by
parochial, local interests on the other.
Conclusion
Our discussion of regional governance in the Netherlands, France and
England suggests that there is a need for a general purpose regional
government, if only as an institutional framework for co-operation and joint
decision-making (cf. Keating & Loughlin, 1997: 12). By this, we do not
plead the substitution of unitary administrative systems by federal ones
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through all-embracing devolution. This would violate values that are central
to the national political culture in the three countries and that are widely
reﬂected in their legislation. Nor do we mean to suggest that regional
governments should become the main institutions for the planning and
provision of public services, thereby reducing local government to mere
agencies. This would violate central values attributed to local government as
an institution where citizens can decide on issues that concern their daily
environment and where they can experience the basics of democracy. We do
argue the case for regional governments with a general competence to co-
ordinate local government policies, entrusted with suﬃcient administrative
powers and ﬁnancial resources to play a signiﬁcant part in the regional
arena. Direct elections and a mandate for regional governance will bring
about the necessary regional perspective, not burdened by individual local
government interests. In the long run, regional governance through co-
operation will not be a viable alternative for regional government.
Notes
1. Recent developments regarding the devolution of powers to Scotland and Wales challenge
the unitary character of the United Kingdom. As our interest focuses on the way unitary
administrative systems deal with the issue of regional governance, we will conﬁne our
analysis to England.
2. At this point we diﬀer from Toonen, who states that provinces rather than municipalities
were the recipients for decentralised tasks (Toonen, 1993: 142). In a number of policy areas
speciﬁc grants were transferred to the Municipal Fund, thereby eliminating the intermediate
role of provinces. In other policy areas speciﬁc funds were amalgamated into broad grants of
which the bulk is directly distributed among the larger cities, leaving the provinces to
distribute the crumbs among the small towns and villages.
3. In 1971 there were 1,500 regional agencies covering more than 30 diﬀerent tasks.
4. Sub-units of the departments, the arrondissements and the cantons mainly served as
administrative organisations for central government services.
5. The Regional Planning Guidance is the long term (20 years) territorial plan that serves as a
framework for local development plans based on the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
The RPG does not directly bind local government. However, central government has formal
powers to intervene in local development plans if these plans ignore the RPG.
6. In France, election turnout for the communes in 1995 and 2001 was 69% and 67%. For the
regional elections turnout dropped from 78% in 1986 to 58% in 1998. In the 2004 elections it
rose to 66%. In the Netherlands, participation in the provincial elections of 1999 reached an
all time low of 45%, while turnout in the municipal elections in 1998 was 59.5%. Scholars of
public administration in the Netherlands have labelled the province as the invisible
administration.
7. Even now, according to a survey by the Local Government Association, local government
fears that elected regional governments will reduce the powers of local government (LGA,
2003: 27).
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